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NOTES AND COMMENTS

tend to indicate bad faith as the primary motive for the majority's selling
itself the stock.
The ease with which the majority of a close corporation can "freeze
out" the minority in the above hypothetical situation as well as in many
other seemingly valid corporation transactions leads to the conclusion
that a change in the law may be desirable to protect the interests of the
minority. One remedy might be to allow a minority stockholder in a
close corporation appropriate legal relief upon his proof that the corporate
transaction in question, engineered by the majority, is one which means
gain to the majority at the expense of a loss by the minority. As an extra
safeguard, the minority plaintiff should possibly be required to make a
sworn allegation that there is no sufficient business reason for the action
of the majority and that the motivation for the transaction is a bad-faith
one designed to "freeze out" the minority. However, the minority should
not be forced to prove this negative allegation; rather, the contrasting
presence of a sufficient business reason and good faith should be an
affirmative defense for the majority in this action.50
The change suggested above is a radical departure from the present
case lav as outlined in this Note, and is a change which surely can be
effected only by legislation. It is believed that this new remedy would
prevent many of the "freeze outs" which now go unredressed without
unduly impairing the efficiency of corporation management.
GASTON H. GAGE
Corporations-Shareholders'
vidual Recovery

Derivative and Direct Actions--Indi-

In recent case of Watson v. Button,1 the former owner of one half of
a corporation's stock brought suit against the corporation's former general manager who had owned the other one half of the stock to recover
the amonut misappropriated by the former general manager prior to their
sale of the corporation to its present owners. The plaintiff and defendant
had agreed to be jointly liable for the corporate debts, and, as a term of
the sale, the general manager secured a release from the purchasers discharging him from any claims and demands existing against him in favor
1O
Cf. S. B. No. 49, N. C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1955 § 55-46 (h) (not enacted),
which refers to a shareholder's remedy for the dilution of his holdings by the
issuance of shares at an inadequate price. This omitted subsection of the proposed
Business Corporation Act would have put on defendant majority the burden of
proving that the offering price of shares is fair if the complaining minority show
all of the following: (1) the absence of a ready and adequate market for the sale
of shareholders' offer rights; (2) notification by the complaining shareholder to
the corporation in writing of his inability to purchase his pro rata share and of his
belief that the offer price is low enough to unfairly dilute his holdings; (3) evidence tending to show previous efforts by the directors, officers, or dominant shareholders to purchase his shares.
1235 F. 2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956).
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of the corporation. The misappropriation was discovered after the sale.
The court recognized that, as a general rule, any cause of action for
misappropriation of corporation assets by a director belongs to the corporation and not to its shareholders. The reasons for this rule are: it prevents a multiplicity of suits; it protects corporate creditors by putting
the proceeds of the recovery back into the corporation treasury; and it
protects all shareholders equally by increasing the value of their shares.
However, the court allowed recovery by the plaintiff in an individual
action because the reasons for the general rule did not exist in this
case. There could be no multiplicity of suits since there were only two
shareholders; creditors would not be prejudiced because the plaintiff and
defendant were obligated by agreement to be jointly liable for the corporate debts; and a recovery by the corporation would not benefit the
injured former shareholder because the plaintiff and defendant had sold
their shares.
Few rules of corporation law are more generally recognized and applied than the one relied upon by the defendant in this case: a shareholder
has no direct, individual right of action against corporate officers for
wrongs to the corporation merely because his investment has been depreciated in value due to their misconduct.2 The rule has been defended
by the courts for a number of reasons.3 The shareholder's remedy is by
a derivative suit in equity if the corporation management fails or wrongfully refuses to bring suit on the corporate right of action. The basis of
equitable relief was found in the absence of any adequate remedy at law.4
The proceeds of such a suit go to the corporation, which increase its assets, and, thus, increase the value of the shareholder's stock.
However, in at least two general classes of cases, the shareholder has
been allowed to recover directly. First, in a number of cases where a
shareholder has brought a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation, courts have denied the usual relief to the corporation and granted
recovery directly to the injured shareholder. In Brown v. DeYoung,5
a minority of injured shareholders brought a derivative suit against the
2

See Annot., 167 A. L. R. 279 (1947).
'Mente & Co. v. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., 176 La. 475, 146 So. 28

(1933) (The primary injury is to the corporation and only incidental to the shareholders; no "privity" betveen the wrongdoer and the shareholder exists) ; Green v.

Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U. S.602
(1928)

(recovery by the corporation will protect all shareholders equally and,

remedy the injury to the shares) ; Wells v. Dane, 101 Me. 67, 63 Ati. 728 (1905)
(multiplicity of suits) ; White v. First Nat'l Bank, 252 Pa. 205, 97 Atl. 403 (1916)
(recovery by the shareholder may result in double liability on the part of the
defendant since the corporation may also have a cause of action) ; Dorrah v.
Pemiscot County Bank, 213 Mo. App. 541, 256 S.W. 560 (1923) (for protection
of creditors) ; BALLENTINE, CORPORArONS § 143 (rev. ed. 1946) (confused damage
problems, and extending the duty of management beyond that owed the corporate
entity).
BALLENTINE, CORPORaTONS § 145 (rev. ed. 1946).
167 Ill.
549, 47 N. E. 863 (1897).
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corporation and its officers for excessive salaries paid to the officers with
the consent of the majority shareholders. The court said that the proper
course in these suits, to compel restoration to the corporation of moneys
improperly appropriated, may very well be, as a general rule, to require
that the misappropriated funds be paid to the corporation rather than to
the injured shareholders personally. Yet where the effect of such a
decree is to benefit the shareholders who assented to and participated in
the misappropriation of the funds, as well as to benefit shareholders innocent of complicity in the transaction, the court held that the decree
should be so framed as to benefit only the innocent shareholder. Complete and perfect relief to those who are entitled to it is all that ever
ought to be given in equity.
In Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co.,0 minority shareholders
brought a derivative suit to recover excessive salaries paid to directors
and officers. The majority shareholders had sold their shares and the
buyers and the minority shareholders maintained the suit. The court
held that subsequent shareholders, assignees of the wrongdoers, cannot
recover, since they had lost nothing. But suit can be maintained in the
name of the corporation for the benefit of minority shareholders, and
recovery will be granted to the extent of their proportionate injury.
In Joyce v. Congdon,7 a derivative suit was brought against officers
and directors who were also majority shareholders, to cancel certain
stock purchased with corporate funds and distributed to the majority
shareholders. The court held that although recovery will generally go
to the corporation, and not to the minority shareholders personally, if
such recovery would result in a shareholder's receiving a portion thereof
to which he was not entitled, equity will look beyond the corporate entity
and decree the recovery to the individual shareholders entitled thereto.
And in Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp.," a derivative suit
was brought against the corporation's officers for injuries to the minority
shareholders when the corporation was dissolved through fraud. The
court held that although this is a derivative suit, in which judgment is
sought for the corporation, where only one shareholder is interested in a
derivative suit, and all creditors have been paid, the court will give
judgment to the shareholder instead of the corporation because there is no
reason why the court cannot select the parties who are entitled to benefit,
and withhold beneficial results from those guilty of fraud or culpably
negligent.
In the recent case of Perhnan v. Feldmann,9 minority shareholders
brought a derivative suit against a former dominant shareholder and
8 130 Md. 523, 100 AtI. 645 (1917).
1114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (1921).
' 150 Misc. 577, 269 N. Y. Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
9219 F. 2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1955).
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principal officer of the corporation to recover personal profits from the
sale of controlling stock which resulted in the corporation's loss of the
right to control distribution of the product in a period of shortage. The
minority shareholders sought to recover their share of the profits in the
sale. The court allowed recovery directly to the minority shareholders
because a recovery by the corporation would only subject the defendants
to a greater total liability, from which culpable parties would be benefitted.
The effect of the decisions in the first class of cases seems to create a
"hybrid" of the derivative suit and the personal action which could be
technically called a derivative suit with direct recovery to the injured
shareholders. The courts seem to be justified in giving such an equitable
recovery because the conventional derivative action, in which the corporation retains the proceeds of the judgment, while giving the complaining
shareholder an adequate remedy, allows unjust enrichment of the wrongdoers.10
The second class of cases consists of at least three situations in which
the injured shareholder is allowed to maintain an individual action in
his own behalf, whether the corporation has a separate right of action or
not.
(1) Where the injury to the corporation is also a direct and personal
injury to the shareholder, resulting in a depreciation in the value of his
shares, courts have held that this personal tort gives rise to an individual
right of action. The fact that the corporation's assets have been injured
does not preclude the shareholder's suit if he was injured by: fraudulent
representations inducing him to form a corporation which failed by
reason of the fraud ;"1 dissemination of false statements about the corporation, to depreciate the value of the plaintiff's shares so the corporate
officers could buy it from him at a low price ;12 or inducing voluntary
bankruptcy by fraud.13 Probably, in any case where the directors' acts
amount to a tort against the shareholder, injury to the corporation will
be no defense to his individual action.
(2) Where there is some special relationship between the plaintiff
shareholder and the wrongdoer, arising out of fiduciary or contractual
agreements, independent of the normal shareholder and director relationship, individual suits have been allowed because of a breach of such
agreements. For example, in Ritchie v. McMicllen,14 where the director
10

There does not appear to be any provision in the present North Carolina

Statutes or in the proposed 1957 Corporation Code dealing with this problem.
2d 898 (1946).
170 P.
"Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d175525,Misc.
1, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 670
1 Coronado Development Corp. v. Millikin,
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
"Adams v. Clark, 239 N. Y. 403, 146 N. E. 642 (1925).
",70 Fed. 522 (6th Cir. 1897) ; See also, Kono v. Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260
N. Y. Supp. 662 (1st Dept. 1932) ; (where there was a breach of a personal con-
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was a pledgee of the injured shareholder's stock, his misconduct resulting in a depreciation in the value of the plaintiff's shares, amounted
to a breach of the pledge agreement and an individual suit was allowed.
(3) If the plaintiff has parted with his shares because of the misconduct of the directors, an individual suit is allowed for the fraud or
coercion that induced him to part with his stock. A derivative suit is
no longer possible since he is no longer a shareholder, and he could not
benefit from another shareholder's derivative suit which would give the
proceeds to the corporation of which he is no longer a member. In Von
Au v. Magenheimer,15 the defendants took excessive salaries, refused to
pay dividends, and committed waste, as a part of a successful attempt to
force the plaintiff to sell his shares. An individual action by the injured
ex-shareholder was allowed. Other cases allow an individual suit where
the plaintiff is forced to sell his shares.16 The economic coercion or fraud
used by the defendants in these cases amounts to a personal wrong against
the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the wrong against the corporation,
and the courts allow an individual suit, and the fact that the corporation
has a right of action also, is no defense to the injured party's suit.
The principal case does not come directly within either of the two
classes of cases that have allowed personal recovery by the shareholder.
It seems to create another situation in which an individual suit is proper;
i.e., when the shareholder has parted with his shares without knowledge
of the wrongdoing (if he had parted with his shares because of the
wrongful acts, it could be classified as a case under the second class), and
the reasons for the general rule do not exist, individual suit by the
injured party is proper. The results of the principal case, and of the
cases in both of the classes cited herein, seem to be desirable and relatively free from theoretical difficulty.
The real objection to permitting a shareholder to recover directly for
his proportionate share of the damage inflicted upon the corporation of
which he is a member is not that the injury was done to the corporate
entity rather than to him, but that the result of such recovery is a return
tract), General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N. Y. 18, 109 N. E. 96 (1915) ; Camp
v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308 (1919) ; Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co., 154 Fed. 606
(8th Cir. 1907).
1126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2nd. Dept. 1908), aft'd, 196 N. Y. 510,
89 N. E. 1114 (1909).
"sHammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N. Y. Supp. 172 (2d. Dept. 1933)
(directors purchased treasury stock without letting plaintiff participate in the
purchase price on a pro rata basis, at an inadequate price, forcing the price of the
shares down, and the plaintiff sold) ; Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp.,
37 S. W. 2d 145 (Tex. Coin. App. 1931) (directors formed a conspiracy to boycott
the corporation for the purpose and with the result of forcing plaintiff to sell his
shares).
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of corporation assets to shareholders without first satisfying corporate
creditors. 17 The ultimate problem before the courts is how to protect
the interests of all the parties involved: the corporation, its creditors, and
its shareholders. Where there is a loss or destruction of corporate assets
as a result of misconduct of directors and officers, the claims of creditors
must be given first consideration, but recovery should be permitted to the
extent necessary to protect innocent shareholders.
The court said in Brown v. DeYoung,18 "Perhaps for the reason that
no such case was ever before complained of, we have been referred to no
authority, and know of none, for affording certain relief to the innocent
shareholder without giving the culpable one what he is not entitled to,
as would be the result if the money be decreed to be paid, generally, into
the corporate treasury. But the lengthening reach of equity into the
manifold intricacies of modern business should not be drawn back simply
for lack of authoritative decision to guide us, where reason and every
equitable consideration point the way with so much clearness."
From the above, it can be seen that courts have refused to be restrained by lack of precedents where inequitable results would be reached
if they followed the general rule. Many variations of the circumstances
in the above cases may arise in the future in which shareholders will
have been defrauded by directors and officers. If the courts will be
guided more by equitable principles than by general rules, the injured
parties will be able to receive a more complete and perfect relief.
Whether or not it would be wise to allow an individual suit, or to
require a derivative suit, is not clear in all circumstances. An individual
action should not be disallowed because the corporation has a separate
right of action, when the wrongful acts of the directors amount to a
separate and distinct injury to both the corporation and the shareholder.
But if the injury to the corporation's assets could be said to be an injury
to the shareholder only in his capacity as a shareholder, it seems that the
derivative suit (which gives direct recovery to the shareholder if necessary), is the best solution to the problem, unless, as in the principal case,
the shareholder has parted with his shares without knowledge of the
directors' wrongful acts. In case of the latter situation, there seems to be
no reason for not allowing an individual suit if creditors are not prejudiced, and the complaining shareholders are the only ones injured by the
misconduct.
RICHARD R. LEE
28

STEvENs, CoRpoRATIoNs § 167, at 792 (2d ed. 1949).

167 Ill. 549, at 558, 47 N. E. 863, at 866 (1897).

